Abstract-A new distributed agent algorithm for resource coallocation to different tasks is proposed. The algorithm extends a belief-desire-intention (BDI) assignment algorithm with resource capability reasoning. It enables resource agents to form coalitions via iterative BDI reasoning and negotiation given the limited capabilities of the resources vis-à-vis task requirements, without directly limiting the coalition size. In the worst case analysis, the number of negotiation rounds required by the algorithm is shown to be of a polynomial order in the number of agents. Empirical evidence from simulations shows that the algorithm yields favorable results in terms of the number of effective coalitions formed for different tasks. Fundamental differences between the proposed algorithm and related work are also discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
C ENTRAL to many real-world applications in a noncentralized environment is the fundamental problem of assigning tasks to resources. The problem becomes even more challenging in many practical settings where, instead of just assigning every task to a different resource [1] , some tasks need to be coallocated with more than one different resource, under different constraints of resource (service) capability and task requirement.
Perhaps, the most basic is the linear (sum) assignment problem (LAP) that deals with the question of how to concurrently assign N distinct tasks to N distinct resources on a one-to-one basis, with maximizing a summation objective function as the optimal goal. LAP manifests itself in a diverse range of interesting applications, either as a resource allocation problem or as a subproblem of resource coallocation, in personnel management, vehicle transportation, manufacturing and telecommunication, for which centralized algorithms have been applied [2] .
Our research aims to develop techniques to address distributed versions of these LAP (or LAP-based) applications, emerged to exploit recent advancement in computer and Internet technology that has made it possible to have situated agents collaboratively plan the assignments by themselves. This is in contrast to a centralized algorithm planning for them. Solved this way, the basic problem is termed a collaborative LAP (CLAP). While the centralized approach was acceptable in the past, it limited active involvement of distributed agents in incremental planning or problem solving.
Our recent work [1] has developed a belief-desire-intention (BDI) negotiation algorithm MA 3 to address CLAP. Using distributed agent reasoning, agents representing different resources negotiate for different tasks, 1 to optimize the sum-total of the application quality-of-service (A-QoS) of one resource for one task. This paper addresses a more general CLAP (G-CLAP) that relaxes the allocation of strictly "one resource to one task" to "several resources to one task," motivating the idea of coalition formation [3] . A coalition is a team of resource agents formed to jointly service a task. G-CLAP seeks an efficient allocation of resources (e.g., limited manpower in a company or sensors of different capabilities in the same network) through coalition formation, to allocate resource coalitions, each to effectively handle a different task. The problem demands cooperation among the resource agents involved. The main benefit of coalition formation is either to accomplish tasks not possible with resource agents acting alone, or to achieve effective handling of tasks and a resulting increase in resource efficiency with the agents working on teams, for different tasks.
In addressing G-CLAP as a distributed agent problem to realize the benefit of coalition formation, an agent faces the basic issue of deciding whom to team up with for which tasks, given its resource capability vis-à-vis task requirements. In so doing, each resource agent not only needs to reason communicatively about its beliefs and preferences (in terms of desires and intentions) as well as its collaborating agents', but also locally reason about its A-QoS to offer for each task. The agent's A-QoS or capability reasoning entails a local model that would eventually decrease its A-QoS with successive task commitments, and depends on various other parametric constraints that characterize its resource capability. Such constraints include maximum task loading and working relationship with other agents for different tasks.
To develop such agents for G-CLAP, the key contribution of the paper includes extending MA 3 (Section II) to C-MA 3 to be concurrently monitored (the tasks) may each require different sensors (the resources) of limited capability which diminishes with increasing task commitments. For instance, where three high-value targets have been singled out for concurrent monitoring, it is desirable that a higher level command could check with three specific sensor agents, C-MA 3 -enabled to negotiate and report if their coalitions formed could effectively monitor the targets. Importantly, C-MA 3 is found to achieve, empirically, a high success rate in terms of the number of effective coalitions formed for different tasks (Section IV), and in the worst case, does so in a number of negotiation rounds of a polynomial order in the number of agents, as analytically established (Section III-D). Fundamental differences that distinguish the proposed C-MA 3 from related work are also examined (Sections V and VI).
II. CLAP AND SOLUTION MA
3 : A REVIEW This section presents CLAP and the relevant details of its solution MA 3 [1] .
A. Problem Statement
} denote a set of tasks and resources respectively; and
, for t i ∈ T, r j ∈ R be a measure of the application quality of service (A-QoS) that a resource r j ∈ R can offer to a task t i ∈ T upon allocation. Assume |T | ≤ |R|. Then, formally, the objective of the |T | × |R| LAP is to find the particular (total) assignment mapping Π : T → R such that for t i , t j ∈ T , i = j implies Π(t i ) = Π(t j ), and the total A-QoS
is maximized over all possible permutations of Π. Intuitively, Π is a one-to-one mapping of tasks to resources. Each permutation represents an assignment (or allocation) set.
The basic approach [1] is to have each task agent represent (i.e., assume the responsibility of selecting a resource r ∈ R for) a task t i ∈ T and initially possess A-QoS knowledge of task t i ∈ T only, namely, the individual A-QoS values d[t i , r] for all resources r ∈ R.
The objective of LAP thus becomes the joint (social) goal of these task agents, and the resulting problem is called a collaborative LAP (CLAP). In attempting to reach an optimal assignment solution, the basic issue a task agent faces is reasoning what resource exchange option to propose, as embodied in MA 3 .
B. BDI Negotiation Algorithm MA 3 : A Model Overview
Among the agent architectures/models (see [4, Ch. 1] ), the BDI model [5] , [6] is one of the best known and studied model of practical reasoning. Based on a philosophical model of human practical reasoning, originally developed by Bratman [7] , the basic model guides us to develop an agent to decide moment by moment which action to take in the furtherance of a goal. We adapt this model, motivated by its appropriateness in allowing us to conceptualize and metaphorically describe an agent's reasoning mechanism, moment by moment, in terms of the agent' mental attitudes Belief B, Desire D, and Intention I to solve CLAP. However, two aspects clearly differentiate our work from existing BDI models. The first is our approach to modeling. Existing BDI models are developed without concisely formulating the problems they attempt to solve while in our work, the BDI model is developed with a clear formulation of the problem it addresses, namely, CLAP. Second, each moment is not a moment of reasoning in reaction to changes in its environment, but a negotiation round of collaborative reasoning-in fact, existing BDI models give no architectural consideration to explicitly multiagent aspects of behavior [8] that is essential for addressing CLAP.
The proposed distributed agent algorithm MA 3 divides the agents' reasoning process into negotiation rounds, and in each round, performs negotiative means-end reasoning, where the end is to increase the social value, i.e., the total allocated AQoS, using the means of resource exchange between two task agents. In each round, each task agent locally accesses and directly acts only on its own row of A-QoS data, and determines its belief set-the information or evidence that indicates all the possible options-the alternative resources-a task agent can exchange its current resource selection for, to achieve its end. Every task agent then begins negotiating by communicating with one another to acquire A-QoS data from any task agent whose current resource selection is in the agent's belief set. In collaborating, any such agents will respond with the required AQoS values, using which the agent would deliberate to determine its own desire set-the means of exchanging its current resource selection for options that survive the deliberation (in that the social value will increase when exchanged for any of these options) with the respective agents (currently holding on to these options). As a final step in a negotiation round, the agent will select the best (local) desire-the one that offers a net exchange gain that is the highest from the agent's perspectiveas its intention, which it would then use as the basis for a resource exchange proposal. All the agents' resource exchange intentions (or the lack thereof) would undergo arbitration to decide which two agents to proceed with the resource exchange, before negotiation is concluded, and the next round begins. MA 3 terminates when simultaneously, all task agents have no (more) intention to exchange resources.
C. BDI Concept Formalization
To formally ground the BDI concepts for CLAP, the following CLAP-specific data structures are formally defined in such a way that they can be naturally interpreted as a task agent's beliefs, desires, and intentions computed in an arbitrary round of collaborative negotiation. In these definitions, the current resource selections of all agents refer to those made under an arbitrary permutation of Π.
Definition 1 (Belief Set B i ): Given that an agent t i ∈ T 's current resource selection is r i ∈ R. Then its (current) belief set B i is given by
If B i = ∅, this means that agent t i ∈ T has at least one alternative resource selection r ∈ B i that may lead to increase in total A-QoS S tot (when made in exchange with an agent whose current selection is r ∈ R). 
If ρ > 0, it means that there is a net exchange gain if agent t i ∈ T gives up its current selection r i ∈ R and selects r j ∈ R, and in exchange, agent t j ∈ T gives up its current selection r j ∈ R and selects r i ∈ R. Thus, any desire d ∈ D i , when carried out, will definitely lead to an increase in total A-QoS without violating Π. Quite naturally, it provides the motivation for agent t i ∈ T to want to exchange its current resource selection.
Definition 3 (Intention
Agent t i ∈ T 's decisive stance or intention has to be I i since it is the best exchange option that the agent can propose. It is said to have no intention if either
Finally, in the role of arbitration, an intention with the highest exchange gain, i.e., one that contributes to the highest increase (in total A-QoS) if carried out, is selected from all the agents' intentions I i ∈ I gathered.
With this formalization, the distributed agent algorithm MA 3 may be specified; it handles the simple role of arbitration through a dedicated agent.
D. Distributed Agent Algorithm
MA 3 assumes that |T | = |R| = N , and consists of an arbitration agent (or arbiter) and a team of task agents, t ∈ T .
1) Algorithmic Details:
The generic BDI reasoning mechanism of a task agent and the simple role of the arbitration agent in an arbitrary round of collaborative negotiation can now be described as follows:
Collaborative (task) agent 1) If the agent believes that there are alternative resource selections that may lead to an increase in total A-QoS, it would, based on its (local) beliefs, generate the desired exchange options or desires, from which the best option will be chosen as its intention. 2) The agent submits its intention (or the lack thereof) to the arbitration agent. 3) Concurrent with Steps 1 and 2, it responds to any requesting task agent whose beliefs it accepts, by sending to the requesting agent the A-QoS values as required for computing the requesting agent's desire. 4) The agent changes its resource selection (and then acknowledges it), proceeds to the next round of negotiation or quit, as decided by the arbitration agent.
1) The agent first receives the intentions (or the lack thereof) of all the task agents. 2) If the agent sees that all the task agents have no intention to exchange, it terminates the negotiation by telling all the task agents to quit. 3) Otherwise, it a) selects an intention with the highest exchange gain and instructs the two agents concerned to proceed with the resource exchange. b) receives acknowledgement of resource exchange made as instructed (from the two agents concerned), before telling all the task agents to proceed to the next round of negotiation.
It has been established that MA 3 always terminates in a finite number of negotiation rounds. Although it does not guarantee an optimal agreement on termination, it has been empirically shown to produce one within about 10% of the optimal almost all the time.
2) An Example: To illustrate the working mechanism of the proposed MA 3 , consider an example problem: Fig. 1 shows two assignment tables or matrices for the problem, in which the resource selection of each agent t i ∈ {t 0 , t 1 , t 2 } is represented by enclosing the corresponding A-QoS value within {}.
Referring to Fig. 1 , Table ( a) represents a randomly selected (initial) assignment and Table ( Both agents believe that they have the best selection because their belief sets are empty, hence no desire, and therefore, no intention. 2) Agent t 2 selects r 2 (as initialized) but, believes that there are alternative resource selections that may increase the total A-QoS, namely resources r 0 and r 1 . It, therefore, generates its desired exchange options as follows. a) For exchange with agent t 0 , the exchange gain is
which is equal to −3 + 8 − 14 + 8 = −1 ≤ 0. b) For exchange with agent t 1 , the exchange gain is
which is equal to −3 + 7 − 6 + 4 = 2 > 0. c) Hence, its only desire is [(t 2 , r 1 ), (t 1 , r 2 ), 2] and is therefore also its intention.
3) To get the required pairs of A-QoS values
} for computing its desire set as done earlier, agent t 2 broadcasts its belief set {r 0 , r 1 } and current selection r 2 ∈ R. The respective agents whose current resource selection is in agent t 2 's belief set respond with those values. In subsequent rounds, such broadcasts and responses are deemed understood and will not be mentioned again. 4) Agents t 0 , t 1 , and t 2 send their intentions (or the lack thereof) to the arbitration agent. 5) The arbitration agent tells agent t 1 to change its resource selection to r 2 and agent t 2 to change it to r 1 . 6) Once both agents t 1 and t 2 inform the arbitration agent that they have changed the selections as instructed, the arbitration agent tells all agents to proceed to the next round of negotiation. b) Round 2: 1) Agent t 0 selects r 0 and believes that it has the best selection because its belief set is empty, hence no desire, and therefore, no, intention. 2) Agent t 1 selects r 2 but believes that an alternative resource selection r 1 may increase the total A-QoS. It, therefore generates its desired exchange options as follows. a) For exchange with agent t 2 , the exchange gain is
which is equal to −4 + 6 − 7 + 3 = −2 ≤ 0. b) Hence, it has no desire, and, therefore, no intention. 3) Agent t 2 , selects, r 1 but believes that an alternative resource selection r 0 may increase the total A-QoS. It, therefore generates its desired exchange options as follows. a) For exchange with agent t 0 , the exchange gain is
which is equal to −7 + 8 − 14 + 5 = −8 ≤ 0. b) Hence, it has no desire, and therefore no intention. 4) Agents t 0 , t 1 and t 2 , send their lack of intentions to the arbitration agent. 5) The arbitration agent tells all agents t 0 , t 1 and t 2 to quit.
The final resource selections of the agents yield the solution as shown in Table ( 
E. Negotiation Complexity
We conclude the review with a complexity result for MA 3 in terms of the number of negotiation rounds, and an approach to reducing communication time per negotiation round. The proof of the complexity result is presented elsewhere [9] .
Theorem 1: Given an arbitrary N × N CLAP instance, the worst case complexity of MA 3 in terms of the number of negotiation rounds is O(N 2 ). For conceptual clarity, the basic model has presented full BDI reasoning for every round of negotiation. In an actual implementation, a task agent would need to (and can easily) avoid full BDI reasoning whenever possible since the determination of especially its desires requires communication to request for the necessary A-QoS data from a number of its collaborating agents, and this could incur a lot of communication time. It turns out that if we allow the arbitration agent to announce the resource exchange intentions that were executed in a previous negotiation round, and this can be easily implemented, a task agent need not always have to do full BDI reasoning beyond the first negotiation round; only two task agents, say agents t x and t y , involved in the resource exchange per arbitrated intention would need to perform full BDI reasoning in the current round, say round k; and we note that the worst case complexity of computing an agent t i 's beliefs r ∈ B k i ⊆ R according to (1) is a linear order O(N ). As for each of the rest, say agent t z , its intention would remain the same as its previous one and so no BDI reasoning is needed, if any resource exchanged in round k − 1 is not in its beliefs; otherwise, with its beliefs unchanged, i.e., B (i.e., desire set determined in the previous round k − 1) but with 1) all desires that involve a resource exchanged in round k − 1 deleted; and 2) new desires determined in round k added. A new desire of each agent t z is deliberated using (2) for exchange gain computation, using AQoS data acquired not through the agent broadcasting its current beliefs as in the first round, but directly requesting the required A-QoS data from only one or both the agents t x and t y per executed intention, provided their current resource selections are in B k z . Such a negotiation is said to involve nonredundant BDI reasoning, which helps reduce the average communication time per round.
III. G-CLAP AND THE PROPOSED SOLUTION C-MA 3
The characteristic constraint of exactly 1 : 1 assignment in CLAP may be too stringent for many applications. Some tasks might need to be assigned to a set of resources, and more generally, these resource sets need not be disjoint (i.e., are overlapping), meaning some resources service more than one task. This generalizes a strictly 1 : 1 assignment to 1 : q assignment (or p : 1 assignment), for p, q ≥ 1.
To illustrate, consider an example with T = {t 0 , t 1 , t 2 } and R = {r 0 , r 1 , r 2 }. A T -centered optimal solution could consist, of the assignment set
which contains 1 : 3, 1 : 2, and 1 : 1 assignment elements, respectively. The resource subsets {r 0 , r 1 , r 2 }, {r 1 , r 2 }, and {r 2 } are termed agent teams or coalitions for the respective tasks t 0 , t 1 and t 2 . Note that the allocated resource sets (between any two tasks') are not necessarily disjoint. An equivalent R-centred solution set is
which contains 1 : 1, 2 : 1, and 3 : 1 assignment elements, respectively. Equivalently, the assigned task sets are not necessarily disjoint. A collaboration problem concerned with such assignments is called a general CLAP (G-CLAP), which seeks a concurrent allocation of m different resources, m ≥ 1, for every task to optimize the sum-total A-QoS of the concurrent allocations.
To address a version of G-CLAP, we propose a distributed agent algorithm, C-MA 3 . Essentially, it uses MA 3 iteratively, but with task set T and resource set R exchanged. In so doing, we instead have C-MA 3 resource agents, each representing a different resource; and they negotiate for tasks to form a team of resource agents r ∈ R for every task t ∈ T .
This more complex G-CLAP is formulated and addressed under different parametric constraints that, importantly, characterize the capabilities of the resources vis-à-vis task requirements without directly limiting the coalition size, as presented in the next section.
A. Terminology and Problem Formulation
The statement for a |R| × |T | G-CLAP can be formally specified following the definition and characterization of: 1) a nonincreasing A-QoS function under task loading, modeling a resource capability; 2) team forming and task commitments in ordered sets; and 3) team effectiveness in terms of task requirements and member compatibility. 
denote a subset allocated to task t i ∈ T , and is said to be a resource team for task t i ∈ T . Similarly, R i is ordered, i.e., r i x ∈ R i , the xth element in R i , offered an A-QoS of d[t i , r i x , x] for task t i ∈ T , by which it was added to the team R i at a negotiation stage 2 indexed by (x + 1).
2) Resource Compatibility and Team Effectiveness:
Let resource subset F j ⊆ R denote only the members in set R that resource r j ∈ R can team up with, inclusive of itself, to service an arbitrary task, such that for two arbitrary sets F a ⊆ R and
Following (4), an arbitrary resource r a ∈ F b ⊆ R is said to be a mutual affiliate of resource r b ∈ R, in the sense that they are complementary resources such that the A-QoS values they offer for each task are additive. Let γ i > 0 denote the A-QoS threshold for task t i ∈ T . It is the minimum level of A-QoS required of a team of resources to service the task. How a value like γ i is determined is application dependent. It is important to note, as with most existing approaches, modeling specific application parameters before applying an approach is a design problem.
Definition 4 (Member Compatibility
λ ii x is said to define the compatibility factor of resource r i x ∈ R (with respect to servicing task t i ∈ T ). m i ≤ |R i | denotes the number of mutual affiliates assembled in team R i that offer nonzero A-QoS values to service t i ∈ T . Henceforth, each such affiliate is called a contributing team member of R i . The righthand side of (5) defines the member-level threshold of a contributing resource r i x ∈ R for t i ∈ T . Definition 5 (Team Effectiveness): An arbitrary resource team R i ⊆ R is said to be effective for task t i ∈ T iff all its contributing members are compatible with task t i ∈ T and its coalition value-the sum-total A-QoS contribution by these membersexceeds the threshold for task t i ∈ T , i.e.,
By Definition 5, we (implicitly) follow a standard assumption [10] that there are design means to transform the utility values held by different agents into common A-QoS (utility) units for interagent comparison.
Referring to the right-hand side of (5), we have noted that
) represents the tolerable deviation from the "average" threshold (per required resource). Therefore, to satisfy (6), this deviation must be compensated for by the other contributing members in team R i .
Let n j = |F j |. Then, since contributing members in any team R i must also be mutual affiliates by definition
Thus, that a contributing member r i x ∈ R i is compatible implies that
The right-hand side of (8) defines the necessary threshold of task t i ∈ T for resource r i x ∈ R. Not greater than that in (5), it is checked against during negotiation [as seen later in Condition a of Constraint Zeroize-A-QoS for the A-QoS model (9)], since m i for a team R i is not known a priori the negotiation, whereas n j for a resource r j ∈ R can be made known.
3) Model for Loaded A-Qos Function:
Let L j denote the load capacity, the limit in the number of tasks that resource r j ∈ R can concurrently service. A formula for an A-QoS function follows. It models (the reasoning that determines) a resource r j ∈ R's uncommitted available/remaining service capability for a task t i ∈ T when it has just been admitted as the xth element 3 in some team R z (for a task t z ∈ T ), i.e., z x = j or equivalently, committed task t z ∈ T as its yth element in H c j , i.e., j y = z, and it is possible z = i. Note that (numerically)
for which
, and is said to define the amount of loss in effectiveness of resource r j ∈ R for task t i ∈ T , due to it committing to one more task t j y ∈ T , i.e., H ; resource r j ∈ R cannot meet the necessary threshold of task
the load capacity of resource r j ∈ R has been fully utilized.
i ; allocated effectiveness for task t i ∈ T has reached or exceeded threshold γ i , where
the contributing member r i x ∈ R that just joined team V i (x + 1) is not r j ∈ R's affiliate. With (9), we see that
Definition 5 of team effectiveness and the nonincreasing AQoS reasoning model (9) imply an additive but not necessarily a superadditive environment; 4 the former definition suggests the bigger the coalition, the better it is, but this is constrained by the latter model which suggests the addition of agents to a task coalition is costly in the sense that doing so, these agents become subsequently less able to meet the A-QoS demands of the other tasks. Therefore expanding coalitions, especially up to a grand coalition (one that includes all the agents [12] ) for a task may not be beneficial overall.
4) |R| × |T | G-Clap Statement:
Assume |T | ≤ |R|. Then formally, the objective, given A-QoS reasoning model (9) in an additive environment, is to find the particular (total) assignment mapping
such that every team Π(t i ) is effective (Definition 5) and the total A-QoS
is maximized over all possible permutations of Π.
In addressing (a softer version of) G-CLAP, unlike MA 3 for CLAP which is concerned with achieving high total A-QoS solutions, the proposed solution C-MA 3 , detailed in the next section, seeks to form as many effective resource teams Π(t i ) as possible, and aims toward, though not necessarily achieving, the (secondary) social goal, max{S ctot (11)}. Importantly, trading the social goal for lower negotiation complexity (Section III-D) does not result in low success rate in forming effective teams (Section IV).
The original G-CLAP as formulated is a complex optimization problem. Formulating an approach to G-CLAP that also achieves its social goal (i.e., yields a globally optimal solution) is an important but challenging direction that should be pursued in future work.
B. Proposed Solution: C-MA

3
C-MA
3 assumes that |T | = |R| = N , and consists of an arbitration agent (or arbiter) and a group of r-agents, r ∈ R. A r-agent is a resource agent that represents (i.e., assumes the responsibility of selecting tasks in T for only) resource r ∈ R, and initially possesses only A-QoS knowledge of the resource it represents, namely d[t, r, 0] > 0 for all t ∈ T .
We call one complete run of the extended algorithm C-MA 3 a course. A course consists of several sessions of negotiation, and one session involves several negotiation rounds. The reference data of agent r j ∈ R for the (x + 1)th session are summarized in Table I . The main idea, then, is to iteratively run each session using MA 3 on iteratively updated A-QoS values, until all A-QoS values reduce to 0.
1) Reasoning Mechanism:
The purpose of negotiation is to allocate, for each task t i ∈ T , an effective team R i , R i = Π(t i ) ⊆ R. In C-MA 3 , every resource agent r j ∈ R negotiates to form its committed task set H c j first, from which the teams R i can be easily determined if desired. Every resource agent r j ∈ R will commit to a task t i ∈ T selected after each session, by adding it to its set H c j . As a result, after the first session, updating the allocable A-QoS values using (9) for the second session 
In forming a team Π(t i ) such that every resource agent needs to technically add a task to its set H c j after every session, noncontributing team members (allocating zero A-QoS values for task t i ∈ T ) may also be included. Only contributing members in a team R i can service task t i ∈ T ; the rest can be removed.
A C-MA 3 resource agent's reasoning mechanism may be presented as follows:
2) Iteratively a) run a session of negotiation via MA 3 ; b) add task selected to committed-task set H c j as the last element (counting from left); c) share and accumulate allocated (partial team) effectiveness for every task; d) update, for every task, the A-QoS values according to (9) ; until it has set all its A-QoS values to 0, and is informed to end the course. 3) Compute to check its compatibility (Definition 4) with each committed task t j x ∈ H c j , and verify team R j x 's effectiveness (Definition 5).
Implicit in C-MA
3 is an arbitration role that can be assumed by a dedicated agent or one of the resource agents, referred to as the arbitration agent. To start the next session, every resource agent involved will first inform the arbitration agent if it is interested to proceed; it is not interested if it has set all its A-QoS values to 0. The arbitration agent will inform all the resource agents to end the negotiation course when all resource agents have indicated the lack of interest to proceed. Within each session, the arbitration agent proceeds as per that in MA 3 . As a final remark, in running MA 3 iteratively, C-MA 3 is attempting to attain the best possible allocation (i.e., one with maximum total A-QoS) of one different resource to every task in each session. In doing so, the coalition size might tend to be minimized since the cumulative team effectiveness for every task should reach or exceed the task threshold sooner.
C. Example
To illustrate the mechanism of C-MA 3 , consider an example of a 3 × 3 G-CLAP, with T = {t 0 , t 1 , t 2 } and R = {r 0 , r 1 , r 2 }. All resources are mutual affiliates, i.e., R = F 0 = F 1 = F 2 , hence n j = 3. The other constant values for Table II . The resource agents' data for session 1 are listed in Table III. In one operational implementation, the arbitration agent first informs all the three agents about the three tasks and informs them to get ready for negotiation. Upon A-QoS initialization, each agent would then respond to the arbitration agent that it is ready. Once the arbitration agent has received all the three responses, it would inform the three agents to proceed with Session 1.
In illustrating, each agent begins the (x + 1)th session with a task selection whose A-QoS value is within (), and when the session ends, it has a new task selection whose A-QoS value is marked "*" on the same reference data table (e.g., Table III for the first session).
After Session 1, we have:
The agents share and accumulate the allocated effectiveness values for every task, as reflected in Table IV 
Each agent then computes and updates the rest of the data accordingly for Session 2, as shown in Table IV . Each agent then informs the arbitration agent if it is interested to proceed with Session 2; it is not interested if it has set all its A-QoS values set to 0. Because at least one agent is interested, the arbitration agent informs the three agents to proceed with Session 2.
After Session 2, we have: 
superscript "?," to indicate that resource r j ∈ R is noncontributing for task t j x ∈ T . As usual, the agents share and accumulate the allocated effectiveness values for every task, and then compute and update the data accordingly for Session 3, as shown in Table V . Each agent then informs the arbitration agent if it is interested to proceed with Session 3. Because all agents are now not interested, the arbitration agent informs them to end the negotiation course. For this negotiation course, after removing the tasks that will not be serviced (i.e., those superscripted with "?" in sets H c j ), the task selections of the three resource agents are as follows: For agent r 0 ∈ R, the committed task set is {t 2 , t 1 }, for agent r 1 ∈ R, it is {t 0 , t 2 }, and for agent r 2 ∈ R, it is {t 1 }. For this example, the overall assignment solution is found to be optimal, with a total A-QoS of (7 + (9 − 1.8)) + (10 + (4 − 0)) + (5) = 33.2. All teams are effective because in team
and
).
D. Worst Case Complexity of Coalition Formation
This section presents a complexity result for C-MA 3 in terms of the number of negotiation rounds. The proof of the result requires the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Given an arbitrary N × N G-CLAP instance, the maximum number of sessions required by C-MA 3 is of the order O(N ).
Proof: In the worst case, each A-QoS value of a resource for a task is nonzero initially, and in every session, for every resource agent r j ∈ R, only the A-QoS value of the task t i ∈ T selected following every session is zeroized (i.e., only Condition b of Constraint Zeroize-A-QoS is satisfied). So the (minimum) number of A-QoS values zeroized after the first session is N .
If N is even, all N agents will make mutual exchanges at least once for nonzero A-QoS values in every subsequent session. It follows that after k sessions, k ≥ 1, there are k zeroized A-QoS values, with respect to both a resource agent and a task. Thus, the (minimum) number of nonzero A-QoS values that are zeroized per session is N . Since the algorithm will terminate when all N To conduct a performance evaluation, we first prototyped a simulator for algorithm C-MA 3 . The simulator consists of a centralized program running on a personal computer. For an N × N problem instance, the program generates and inputs each of the N ! initial assignment solutions to a reasoning mechanism that computes the agents' task selections which would have resulted from the distributed agent algorithm C-MA 3 . In principle, C-MA 3 can handle an arbitrary problem size N . But for a complete unbiased simulation, the number of simulation runs or courses carried out is N ! per problem instance. Clearly for a big N , it can become intractably time consuming to simulate for a large number of problem instances. For experimental purposes, we limit N = 6, requiring 6! (or 720) simulation runs per problem instance. Despite this limit, we Fig. 2 . C-MA 3 simulations. Some empirical (average) results for 100 randomly generated 6 × 6 solvable problem instances note that the simulation results also provide a practical reference for addressing larger problems that can be decomposed into smaller subproblems for C-MA 3 . Problem decomposition, however, is usually done based on application-specific criteria; this is beyond the scope of this paper.
The problem instances were generated under the following settings: For all
and γ i were randomly generated. A problem is said to be " solvable" if there is at least one initial assignment (in Session 1) out of N ! on which the simulator arrives at an assignment solution in which all teams are effective. We ran the simulations until 100 solvable problem instances were generated and simulated. Only the simulation results for solvable instances were recorded.
The simulation results show that the maximum number of sessions per run was about 4 < N and the maximum number of rounds per course was 21 N 3 . In terms of the number of negotiation rounds, MA 3 has a worst case complexity of O(N 2 ) (Theorem 1). However, running as a session in C-MA 3 , it is empirically lower since, due to A-QoS zeroization, the number of negotiation rounds decreased (or the negotiation speed increased) in each successive session This is depicted in Fig. 2(a) .
All these suggest that practically, C-MA 3 might frequently form coalitions in a number of rounds of a lower order than its worst case analytical bound of O(N 3 ) (Theorem 2). The increase in speed in successive sessions means that if C-MA 3 were to be halted in the midst, the leverage on this feature will be lost. However, it does not imply that the algorithm is not anytime ready; a solution (a team for each task) is still anytime available whenever C-MA 3 needs to be halted before it would have normally terminated. But as with any anytime ready algorithm, high solution quality cannot be guaranteed whenever it is halted this way; herein unlike that for MA 3 which is solely concerned with efficiency in resource utilization, solution quality includes effectiveness in handling tasks, i.e., it is also defined in terms of the number of tasks effectively satisfied by the resource teams formed.
It is also found that the average number of tasks satisfied was 0.9N . A general observation is that the larger the number of sessions required, the larger the number of tasks found to be effectively satisfied. Finally, in Fig. 2(b) , we present, graphically, the average probabilities obtained of C-MA 3 converging with N , at least (N − 1), (N − 2), and (N − 3) tasks satisfied. It can be inferred that for N = 6, a solvable problem instance is almost guaranteed (99.2%) to have at least (N − 2) tasks satisfied.
V. RELATED WORK
C-MA
3 provides an anytime ready solution for G-CLAP, and is simple and easy to implement. It is perhaps the only attempt that uses the solution concept of BDI assignment in negotiation for coalition formation. A unique feature is that, as negotiation progresses, the C-MA 3 resource agents, following every session, check for satisficing solutions, i.e., whether the coalitions being formed are effective enough for each task, while also reasoning to update their capability status according to their A-QoS model (9) .
A. Coalition Formation
Under different problem scenarios, coalitions can be formed, either by centralized reasoning for self-interested agents [3] , [13] , [14] within a game-theoretic framework, or by distributed reasoning among agents within a multiagent framework that can be cooperative [15] or noncooperative [16] . The coalitions formed are either disjoint [13] , [14] or overlapping [15] .
In [15] and [17] , coalition formation has been utilized as a means for cooperative agents to coordinate the order of execution of subtasks, so as to maximize some system utility outcome (reminiscent of the total A-QoS in our context), but not necessarily reducing the execution time. In our work, it is utilized as a means for cooperative (resource) agents to have their resources effectively coallocated to handle independent tasks concurrently (i.e., tasks that need to be done in the same time period). Each resource agent in C-MA 3 has a task loading limit-a necessary and intuitive characterization of resource capability-without directly limiting the number of agents on a team as imposed in [15] to reduce algorithmic computations. Unlike with C-MA 3 , the optimal solution that may be attained by the latter given a limit on agent team size can be arbitrarily far from the actual optimal solution (without the limit), as noted in [14] .
Other related work has focussed on coalition formation in competitive, game-theoretic environments (e.g., among different companies or self-interested individuals). In this setting [14] , [16] , coalition formation involves three activities: 1) coalition structure generation (grouping the agents into coalitions); 2) solving each coalition's (optimization) problem within the coalition; and 3) dividing the value of each coalition among member agents. In ours, it involves, roughly speaking, interleaving the first two activities among the C-MA 3 resource agents to form agent coalitions during problem solving, concurrent with a different activity 3) which checks, as a necessity for team effectiveness, each cumulative coalition value-the sum-total A-QoS contribution by all contributing members in a coalition as it is being formed-against a (minimum) task requirement. Activity 3) helps determine if the coalition formation is successful, and is completed after coalition members' compatibility with assigned tasks and the effectiveness of their fully formed coalitions have been verified. The existing approach differs fundamentally from ours on activity 3), since coalition formation is by self-interested agents concerned with how gains from cooperation are to be distributed [16] , while ours is by cooperative task-centric resource agents concerned with whether the coalitions formed provide enough A-QoS's (the gains) to satisfy task requirements.
The proposed C-MA 3 complements related research work with overlapping coalition formation by distributed agent reasoning in a cooperative multiagent framework for a different resource coallocation problem, G-CLAP.
B. Distributed Constraint Reasoning
There are some efforts not cast in the context of coalition formation but appear to have addressed a similar problem in the context of distributed constraint reasoning, notably, work on distributed constraint optimization problem (DCOP) (e.g., [18] and [19] ). In principle, CLAP and G-CLAP are DCOPs. However, being perhaps overly general, existing DCOP techniques seek to indirectly minimize the cost values associated with satisfying constraints between agents, not directly the values associating the variables and their individual domain values. In reformulating CLAP as a DCOP, T becomes a set of "variables," R becomes a finite discrete domain for every variable t i ∈ T , but the function to maximize 5 becomes a rather unintuitive one given by In any case, current DCOP techniques are still largely algorithmic; they do not exploit important agent concepts such as BDI, agent coalition and capability reasoning to provide conceptually clearer agent-based solutions that aid in the better understanding of fundamental application problems. DCOP techniques also do not lend themselves readily to incremental 5 We assume that current DCOP techniques for minimizing cost can be easily modified for maximizing utility (or A-QoS).
problem solving, so their solutions are not guaranteed to be anytime ready, unlike MA 3 and C-MA 3 .
C. Contracting
In [20] , the idea of contracting to address a task allocation problem [20] is proposed. The problem definition [20, p. 68, Definition 1] is not only similar to G-CLAP, but is also not cast in the context of coalition formation. More importantly, the individual agents considered therein are self-interested, and each deals with a cost function of handling subsets of tasks. This contrasts with C-MA 3 resource agents which are cooperative, and informed with a resource capability model (9) . This model explicitly characterizes the nonincreasing capability level of a collaborative agent for uncommitted tasks, as negotiation progresses and the agent continually commits to more tasks. Technically, contracting strives to achieve an optimal task allocation whereas our approach enables resource capability reasoning through iterative BDI assignment negotiation [1] to arrive at as many effective coalitions as possible; global efficiency in resource utilization (social goal) is treated as a secondary objective.
D. Other Related Approaches
Outside the realm of coalition formation, there are several other approaches to overlapping problems on allocation of objects, be they resources, tasks, or roles. For example, in [21] , BDI and POMDP models are combined to address role allocation in teams. In [22] , the idea of capability matching to perform allocation is proposed. In [23] and [24] , different ideas of auctions to decide on how tasks should be assigned or allocated are developed. As with C-MA 3 , these different techniques treat modeling an application as a design issue outside their jurisdiction. In [25] , a role (re)allocation algorithm is developed to enable autonomy of role reallocation to shift between a human supervisor and the agents. Other related approaches include reconfiguration methods for reforming a team [26] , self-adapting organizations [27] , and dynamic reorganizing groups [28] .
The main idea that distinguishes from existing allocation approaches is our introduction of resource capability (reasoning) models for the formation of effective coalitions: this enables negotiation that dynamically allocates, taking into explicit account the individual capability of agents that would naturally lower as the agents commit to additional tasks in the process of their joining and forming task coalitions. The negotiation process is accelerated by Constraint Zeroize-A-QoS for the A-QoS model (9) , which decrements an agent's balance capability accordingly upon its task commitment that concludes a session, up to or before its task loading limit is reached.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented a BDI coalition formation algorithm C-MA 3 as an approximate but effective solution of low negotiation complexity to N × N G-CLAP, a resource coallocation problem. C-MA 3 extends MA 3 [1] by inheriting its BDI negotiation model for communicative reasoning, and incorporating a local A-QoS (capability) reasoning model, exploited to avoid computing all possible coalitions and directly limiting the coalition size. To the best of our knowledge, no other coalition formation research has attempted to solve a resource coallocation problem that explicitly considers resource capability reasoning.
Empirical evidence from C-MA 3 simulations on solvable N × N G-CLAP instances shows that C-MA 3 yields favorable results in terms of the number of effective coalitions formed for different tasks. An objective assessment shows that in the worst case, the algorithm can form coalitions in a number of negotiation rounds of a polynomial order O(N 3 ) (Theorem 2), with empirical evidence suggesting that practically, the complexity order can frequently be lower. Future work includes gathering more insights of C-MA 3 with varied parametric settings, conducting a probability evaluation on the various extents (e.g., within 5%, 10%) that the total A-QoS of a solution produced deviates from the optimal one (social goal) achievable, and seeking ways to speed up coalition formation and improve global efficiency. To demonstrate the practical applicability of C-MA 3 , it is also expected to include empirical studies to be carried out: 1) in a context specific to an application (e.g., resource allocation in grid computing), and 2) on a large scale.
